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Israel had lost 40 jets in first 12 hours: Ex-IAF fighter pilot shuts down critics, says count wins - not losses

Israel had lost 40 jets in first 12 hours: Ex-IAF fighter pilot shuts down critics, says count wins - not losses

The pilot questioned Pakistan Air Force's claims of six Indian aircraft being shot down, calling them speculative and unsupported.

Saurabh Sharma
Saurabh Sharma
  • Updated Jun 3, 2025 9:48 PM IST
Israel had lost 40 jets in first 12 hours: Ex-IAF fighter pilot shuts down critics, says count wins - not lossesFormer IAF captain shuts down debate on air losses during Op Sindoor

The Indian Air Force's reported losses during Operation Sindoor have triggered fierce debate, but veteran fighter pilot Group Captain Ajay Ahlawat says critics are missing the bigger picture. Drawing parallels with historical air campaigns, he stressed that tactical setbacks — even with aircraft losses — do not define the outcome of an air war.

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Writing in The Print, Ahlawat addressed the fallout from Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan's remarks to Bloomberg TV at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, where the CDS admitted to certain Indian aircraft losses during the operation. "In all likelihood, we did lose some aircraft. The exact number and the causes would be revealed by the Indian Air Force (IAF), should they choose to," he said, adding that every such incident is studied in detail —covering tactics, weapon types, and even the possibility of friendly fire.

He questioned Pakistan Air Force (PAF) claims of six Indian aircraft being shot down, calling them speculative and unsupported. "They have failed to provide any evidence other than a sleazy presentation and social media posts.” He added that some Chinese PL15 missiles used by Pakistan were found intact on Indian soil, casting doubt on their operational success.

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On allegations that the IAF paused air activity after suffering early losses on May 6–7, Ahlawat said: "Nothing could be further from the truth." He noted that while the IAF reviewed tactics and electronic warfare inputs, limited strikes were carried out by Rafale and BrahMos-armed Su-30s on May 8–9. Around-the-clock air defence patrols and ground-strike readiness were maintained, alongside active SEAD/DEAD missions to suppress Pakistan's air defences.

The IAF's posture intensified after Pakistan launched Operation Bunyan al-Marsoos on May 10. In response, India conducted precision retaliatory strikes across Pakistan, backed by satellite imagery. "The IAF rose to challenge the PAF’s hubris with an updated game plan. Electronics were tweaked, formations were rearranged, weapons were matched to the targets, and the IAF was not constrained by any restrictive ROE. The orders were clear: shoot to kill."

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Ahlawat added that Pakistan's much-touted J10C and PL15 combo failed to bring down any of the Indian jets. "These aircraft were operating deep inside Pakistan's airspace and failed to launch even a single BVR, which just a day prior had been celebrated as a 300-km-long stick."

To put attrition into perspective, Ahlawat drew on the Israeli experience during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. "Israeli Air Force was pitted against the combined air power of Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War (October 6–25, 1973). Although the Arabs had a greater number of aircraft, Israel enjoyed a significant technical edge in air power. The IsAF was also considered to be better trained, as it frequently exercised with Western air forces. Despite these advantages, the IsAF’s losses in the first 12 hours were staggering: thirty A-4s, six Phantoms, and four Super Mystères were downed."

Yet, he pointed out, Israel quickly adapted, revised tactics, launched SEAD missions, and ultimately achieved air superiority. "The IsAF decided on an operational pause, took a hard look at its tactics, revised them, and went up again. The IsAF adjusted its tactics to minimise exposure to SAMs and anti-aircraft artillery. Dedicated SEAD/DEAD missions were flown, occasionally in coordination with ground-based artillery fire. In the following days, the IsAF gained and maintained control of the air. The outcome of the war is a well-known historical fact."

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This example, the fighter pilot added, along with the employment of Indian air power during Operation Sindoor, proves a point: "despite the great care taken during planning, attrition in air war is unavoidable. These examples also tell us that an eventual victory is decided not merely by tallying losses incurred on both sides but by comparing mission success rates."

"For people not familiar with the planning and structuring of an air campaign against a peer competitor, the loss of our own aircraft might come as a surprise,” he wrote. "However, despite advances in weaponry and sensors, air forces around the world cater for attrition in air war, especially in the early hours, when you fly into a hornet's nest."

He stressed that success must be measured by mission outcomes, not just hardware losses. "Wars are dirty business...Victory, however, will be measured against the degree to which the objectives — or 'conditions of termination' — set forth before the campaign were achieved. In that regard, Operation Sindoor was a resounding victory for Indian air power."


 

Published on: Jun 3, 2025 7:19 PM IST
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